

МОДЕЛЬ ТЕОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО, СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПСИХОЛОГИ- ЧЕСКОГО СОПРОВОЖДЕНИЯ РЕПАТРИАНТОВ, ВЕРНУВШИХСЯ ИЗ ЗОН ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКОЙ АКТИВНОСТИ: КАЗАХСТАНСКИЙ КЕЙС

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Аннотация. В январе 2019 года Казахстан начал эвакуацию своих граждан, оказавшихся в районе действий международных террористических организаций на территории Сирии и Ирака. Несмотря на трехлетний период реабилитации и реинтеграции репатриантов, отмечаются сложности в реализации программы, связанные с нехваткой квалифицированных специалистов, нерешенностью бытовых и финансовых проблем репатриантов и опекунов детей, возвращенных с территории Ближнего Востока, секьюритизацией жизни вернувшихся женщин, их социальной стигматизацией, отсутствием адекватных индикаторов эффективности проводимой работы. На основе контент-анализа публикаций и комментариев в социальных сетях изучены недостатки информационной и коммуникационной стратегии, ограничивающие реализацию инициативы государства по возвращению граждан из зон военного конфликта и их реабилитации. В общественном сознании сохраняются стереотипы об угрозах, исходящих от вернувшихся лиц. Общественное осуждение и неприятие создает антитерапевтический эффект и осложняет процесс реинтеграции женщин и детей. Результаты экспертного опроса указывают на то, что игнорирование гендерного фактора при дерадикализации женщин-репатриантов привело к тому, что многие технологии, применяемые для исправления радикального поведения и убеждения мужчин в пенитенциарной системе, в том числе, теологическая коррекция, превратились в «неработающие инструменты».

Имеющиеся уязвимости в программе реабилитации могут привести к повторной радикализации репатрианок.

Ключевые слова: репатрианты из Сирии, реабилитация, реинтеграция, дерадикализация.

ТЕРРОРИСТИК БЕЛСЕНДІЛІК АЙМАҒЫНАН ОРЛҒАН РЕПАТРИАНТТАРДЫ ТЕОЛОГИЯЛЫҚ, ӘЛЕУМЕТТІК-ПСИХОЛОГИЯЛЫҚ ҚОЛДАУ МОДЕЛІ: ҚАЗАҚСТАНДЫҚ КЕЙС

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Аңдатпа. 2019 жылғы қаңтарда Қазақстан Сирия мен Ирак аумағындағы халықаралық террористік ұйымдардың әрекеттер ауданында болған өз азаматтарын эвакуациялауды бастады. Репатрианттарды оңалту мен қайта интеграциялаудың үш жылдық кезеңіне қарамастан, бағдарламаны іске асыруда білікті мамандардың жетіспеушілігімен, Таяу Шығыс аумағынан оралған репатрианттар мен балалардың қамқоршыларының тұрмыстық және қаржылық мәселелерінің шешілмеуімен, оралған әйелдердің өмірін қорғаумен, олардың әлеуметтік стигматизациясымен, жүргізіліп жатқан жұмыс тиімділігінің барабар индикаторларының болмауымен байланысты қиындықтар байқалады. Әлеуметтік желілердегі жарияланымдар мен түсініктемелерге контент-талдау жасау негізінде әскери қақтығыс аймақтарынан азаматтарды қайтару және оларды оңалту жөніндегі мемлекеттің бастамасын іске асыруды шектейтін ақпараттық және коммуникациялық стратегияның кемшіліктері зерделенді. Қоғамдық санада оралған адамдардан келетін қауіптер туралы таптаурындар сақталуда. Қоғамдық айыптау мен қабылдау терапияға қарсы әсер етеді және әйелдер мен балалардың реинтеграция үдерісін қиындатады. Сараптамалық сауалнаманың нәтижелері репатриан-әйелдердің дерадикализациялау кезінде гендерлік факторды елемей пенитенциарлық жүйеде ерлердің радикалды мінез-құлқы мен сенімдерін түзету үшін қолданылатын көптеген технологиялардың, соның ішінде теологиялық түзетудің «жұмыс істемейтін құралдарға» айналғанын көрсетеді. Оңалту бағдарламасындағы осалдықтар репатрианттардың қайтадан радикалдануына әкелуі мүмкін.

Түйін сөздер: Сириядан оралған репатрианттар, оңалту, реинтеграция, дерадикализация.

THE THEOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT MODEL FOR RETURNEES RETURNING FROM AREAS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY: THE CASE OF KAZAKHSTAN

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Abstract. Since January 2019, Kazakhstan has been evacuating its citizens from the terrorism-affected area in Syria and Iraq. Yet, three years later, rehabilitation and reintegration proved ineffective especially in regards to women and children. The programme faces a number of obstacles, i.e. shortages of qualified professional personnel and underdevelopment of the indicators; capacity deficit in tackling domestic and financial problems of the repatriated persons; safety and stigmatization of the returned women.

The article is focused on the shortcomings of the information and awareness-raising component of the programme. The content analysis of the materials from the printed and social media revealed the limitations of the measures aimed at repatriation and rehabilitation of the persons evacuated from the terrorism-affected areas who are still regarded as ‘posing security threat’ by ordinary people. Public condemnation and resentment have an anti-therapeutic effect and complicate reintegration of such women and children.

Moreover, the findings of the expert survey indicate that the gender factor has been neglected and de-radicalization measures aimed at repatriated women - including so-called ‘theological correction’ - are similar to those applied while working with male inmates in the penitentiary facilities in Kazakhstan. These have also been proved ineffective. The author concludes that the acute shortcomings in the rehabilitation programme may result in re-radicalization of the repatriated women.

Key words: *repatriates from Syria, rehabilitation, reintegration, de-radicalization.*

Introduction

A feature of contemporary terrorism is that it is global. The Syrian crisis, which escalated into a civil war started in 2011, has attracted the interest of thousands of Muslims around the world. A 2017 report by The Soufan Group (SG), a nongovernmental analytical organization, indicates that Russia was the first place to import foreign terrorist fighters, with 3,417 people involved in military conflicts in Syria and Iraq on the side of terrorist groups. Next was Saudi Arabia with 3,244 recruits and Jordan with 3,000 fighters. Tunisia sent 3,000 men to the zone of armed conflict, while France sent 1,910. About 5,000 fighters were recruited from Central

Asia. The largest number of recruits came from Uzbekistan (1,500) and Tajikistan (1,300). [1].

Since the beginning of the military conflict, according to the National Security Committee, about 800 citizens of Kazakhstan have left for Syria and Iraq, including about 120 men, more than 250 women and 500 minor children. [2]. Religious identity, the perception of oneself as part of an “imagined Ummah,” was primarily the trigger for Kazakhs to travel with their entire families to a zone of terrorist activity, to the so-called “Islamic State”. [3].

Research methods

The methodological basis of the study is a content analysis of online publications containing information about the return of Kazakh citizens from Syria and Iraq and comments to them, discourse analysis of official messages, and expert surveys of theologians involved in the program of deradicalization of returnees.

Results of the Research and Discussion

most of the current scholarly research focused on understanding the radicalization process of violent Islamist [4], but much less work was focused on the equally important process of deradicalization or how individuals or groups disengage from extremist groups and ideologies. A number of countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe, to varying degrees, have taken active measures to prevent radicalization of vulnerable individuals and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism. A key question for researchers is the purpose of these programs: disengagement (changing behavior) or deradicalization (changing beliefs) of radicals. Studies of deradicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe have shown that the most developed programs use local cultural patterns to achieve their goals. Such programs cannot simply be transferred from one country to another. They must develop organically in a particular country and culture. Kazakhstan, taking into account the other countries' experience, has nevertheless developed its own approach to deradicalization and re-socialization of citizens who have returned from areas of terrorist activity, taking into account the national code. The domestic program aims to change the beliefs of those who have returned from areas of terrorist activity. International experience shows that such an approach is practically unrealizable. Experts working with returnees also point out the difficulty of achieving indicators of deradicalization. Meanwhile, the process of re-socialization and reintegration of women who have returned from Syria is complicated by material, domestic and financial difficulties, social rejection, and the securitization of their lives.

Kazakh citizens evacuated from terrorist activity areas

Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state whose citizens were in the war zone to begin a humanitarian operation in 2019 to remove its compatriots from camps for prisoners in northeastern Syria, the area controlled by Kurdish groups. According to official discourse, the removal of Kazakhs from the territory of Syria and Iraq, despite the mixed reaction of the country's citizens, is related to the national security of the state.

Most terrorist organizations view family members of fighters, particularly children, as potential and already ideologically trained recruits. Moreover, the loss of ISIS' territorial positions in Syria and Iraq does not mean that the group is completely defeated and disintegrated. ISIS quickly transformed into an underground terrorist network [5]. One way or another, there was a possibility that several hundred Kazakh children, who did not have the slightest idea of their homeland, being in unfavorable social conditions and growing up in an alien reality, would become a potential tool for destructive forces. And the ethnicity of these children would be used against the countries of Central Asia. It is likely that these children could have been assembled into a detachment or a fighting group. After receiving military instruction in training camps in Syria, the children of Kazakh radicals could have dispersed around the world. Tracking the movement of children would have been problematic - most of them did not have any documents, accordingly, it would have been difficult to identify them. Accordingly, leaving so many children in Syria and Iraq was risky [6].

As part of humanitarian operation "Zhusan" in 2019 from January 5 to June 26, 2021, February 5, 2019, 607 citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, including 37 men, 157 women, 413 children were evacuated from areas of terrorist activity. Under Operation Rusafa, which took place on November 27-28, 2019, 14 children were released from Iraqi prisons and evacuated to Kazakhstan [7].

The implementation of the operation was entrusted to representatives of the RK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, employees of the National Security Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the RK Ministry of Defense. Criminal charges were brought against 33 men and 19 women for involvement in the activities of the international terrorist organization "Islamic State".

Social and psychological support for women and children

Women and children arrived from the conflict zone were placed in a rehabilitation center in Aktau for a 30 days quarantine. This stage of rehabilitation was accompanied by medical examination, restoration of documents of the evacuees, and genomic examinations to establish the maternity of children born in Syria.

The second stage of rehabilitation of women and children was related to their socialization; many women received initial or repeated vocational training and were employed. Some of the children born in Syria were given Kazakh citizenship in order to avoid stigmatization in the future. After working with social pedagogues and tutors and undergoing psychological-medical-pedagogical counseling, children were enrolled in pre-school institutions or general education schools. Women rehabilitation was accompanied by psychological and social support. Currently, there are 14 rehabilitation centers in Kazakhstan engaged in the deradicalization and rehabilitation of people who have returned from areas of terrorist activity. They are located in Mangistau, Karaganda, Zhambyl, Aktobe region, Kokshetau, Atyrau, Shymkent, Pavlodar, Nur-Sultan, Zhezkazgan and Kaskelen [8].

As part of rehabilitation and reintegration programs, children were helped to enroll in kindergartens and schools, including in preparation for learning (tutors

were hired to work with children, since children in the conflict zone were not attending educational institutions, and their knowledge and skills did not meet age requirements accepted in Kazakhstan).

Special attention is paid to children's leisure time for a faster resocialization (visits to museums and exhibitions, familiarization with the history and culture of Kazakhstan, the implementation of developmental projects aimed at the formation of critical thinking skills, the organization of creative classes on hobbies).

According to the data of the Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan, 202 on 447 returned children are enrolled in school, and one child was recognized as unteachable due to health conditions. Out of 248 preschool age children, 113 were placed in kindergartens. Of the 46 orphans, 38 were placed with relatives, 4 went to a family-type children's village (Atyrau) and 4 went to the Nur-Sultan Child Support Center. In other cases, if relatives (citizens of Kazakhstan) were not found for those returned orphans, then such children were sent for adoption.

Over 150 children attend additional educational organizations (clubs, hobby groups). The allocation of children to schools was not based on the territorial principle but taking into account the availability of the necessary specialists in schools who are ready to participate in the rehabilitation and reintegration process (*id est*, social pedagogues and psychologists). Child's biological age was taken into account to assign children to classes, although the main criterion was their readiness to study at a particular level. In case of a discrepancy in biological age and level of readiness, teachers and psychologists worked with the child, alongside with the children's parents in the class to which the child who had returned from the conflict zone was assigned. An individual plan of social rehabilitation was developed for each child, in which the results of the work were recorded step-by-step.

Children's rehabilitation is conducted by teachers and psychologists according to individual programs and plans. According to the estimates of the staff of the Ministry of Education and Science, the children are now generally adapted to Kazakh society and do not need psychological and theological assistance.

Courses have been organized for women to acquire new, in-demand professions in the Kazakh labor market (accounting courses, massage courses) in order to further their socialization and financial independence. At the initial stage, rehabilitation centers were able to provide food baskets for women [9].

Here it is important to mention the role of other informal social institutions, like the Uzbek *mahalla*, in the process of reintegration and deradicalization. The use of this kind of institutions for that purpose has been studied by many authors and experts, in the framework of the so-called community-based approach. In the 19th century, the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies said that there are some differences between the idea of "society" and the concept of "community". Kazakhstan, as a state, has the duty to help and protect its citizens, even if they are wrong or they mislead their options and chose "the bad path"; so, its obligation is to help those people to come back to the right way. As a society, Kazakh people need to know that they will be a stronger and more united group if they are able to reintegrate

those former foreign fighters (as their relatives are also part of that society). Nevertheless, there is another level of engagement in society, the community, where the links among the members are even stronger and deeper: the community, the relationship with the relatives and the neighborhood. According to the community-based counterterrorism fight theories, the community play an important role, first of all, not only in detecting the beginning of the process of radicalization, but also in helping those people when they come back to accept they were wrong and restart a new life far from radicalized messages [10].

One of the most important problems here is the right use of concepts and terms. Following the Alonso pyramid to describe the radicalization process, there is no problem with having faith (believers), or with wanting to follow strictly the original rules of that faith (radicals). Maybe the problems come when those radicals want to transform their creed into a political ideology stripped from its original religious sense (fundamentalists) and, of course, with those people justifying the use of violence to get those political goals (extremists) and, absolutely, with those people who use violence to obtain such objectives (jihadists) [11].

Theological work with returnees

The peculiarity of the Kazakh model of deradicalization is the emphasis on the theological correction of views. One indicator of deradicalization is the adoption of the Hanafi creed. A similar approach is characteristic of the program in Saudi Arabia, where work on re-education through religious debate is carried out, a kind of “ideological detoxification” [12]. The local Religious Affairs Departments, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan, and theologians from Nur-Mubarak University are involved in consulting and rehabilitating work. However, interviews in depth with repatriate women show that they view theological work as imposing the Hanafi *mazkhab* [13].

Meanwhile, theologian Askar Sabdin sees the function of theological correction in the deconstruction of illusions and utopia modeled by radical ideology. He points to the following radical narratives in need of correction:

- The narrow interpretation of jihad, understood as violent struggle against the enemies of Islam;
- The mythologization and politicization of the prophetic era, which ultimately leads to the idealization of a religious and political utopia;
- The deformation of the term *Jamaat*, which is interpreted as a separate group;
- The dichotomies of “*dar al-Islam*”/“*dar al-kharb*” (the territory of Islam/the territory of war); *al-uala ul-bara* (the principle of friendship and non-involvement);
- The *takfir*, accusing Muslims of disbelief with further legalization of violence against them;
- The *taghut*, which, as radicals understand it, can imply all non-theocratic countries, their administrative and legal system, ideology, constitution, ruler, judicial system, etc.
- The sacralization, romanticization of death or martyrdom (pseudo-*Shahidism*);
- The concept of the triple monotheism: 1) *ar-Rububiah* - monotheism in the

supremacy of Allah, the conviction that Allah alone is the Lord and Creator of all things. 2) *al-Uluhiya* - monotheism in the divinity of Allah, the conviction that Allah alone is worthy of worship. 3) *al-Asma uas Syfat* - monotheism in the divine Names and Attributes, as they are mentioned in the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*.

The theoretical threefold classification of monotheism has contributed to the fragmentation of society into misguided “polytheists Muslim”, who are content with monotheism in the domination (*rububiya*), and “true Muslims”, who recognize all three types of monotheism. The latter, in turn, leads to the practice of accusing Muslims of disbelief and polytheism, of permitting them to wage “*jihad*” with them, to shed their blood, and to consider their property available as spoils of war [14].

In contrast to the European approach to deradicalization, where the rejection of the ideology of violence is considered sufficient [15], Kazakh theologians are tasked not only to destroy the construction of “militancy,” but also to change beliefs. Thus, the following indicators of deradicalization are highlighted:

- Rejection of *takfir* (accusation of disbelief);
- Rejection of the distorted perception of the term “*taghut*” and extrapolation of this concept to the constitutional structure of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the state system;
- Adoption of the Hanafi *mazkhab*;
- Adoption of Kazakh traditions and culture;
- Recognition of the secular and legal nature of the state.

Meanwhile, experts talk about a lack of gender sensitivity in dealing with female returnees. Existing deradicalization tools, which were used mainly for men in prisons, were transferred to female returnees, without taking into account the peculiarities of female radicalization. There is also an acute shortage of female theologians, as practice has shown that female specialists and female returnees develop a more trusting relationship.

At the same time, according to some experts, it is almost impossible to achieve all of the above indicators of deradicalization, and theologians often formally indicate in their reports that they are completely over-educated, while results have been achieved in only one or two areas.

Female radicalization factors and difficulties of reintegration

Interviews with female repatriates given in studies by Kazakh scholars Burnashev R., Chernykh I., and Shapoval Y. show that for most of them the departure to Syria was dictated by the patriarchal family structure, spouse unconditional submission to the husband, as well as, in some cases, a sense of infringement of religious rights and a desire to improve material conditions.

Political scientist Yerlan Karin points out the unfavorable socio-economic conditions as a factor of departure for Syria in his study. The radicals from Kazakhstan were predominantly from the western and central parts of the country. Western Kazakhstan, rich in oil and gas resources, lags behind other regions in many socio-economic criteria, and the relatively high prices of various consumer

goods “eat up” a significant part of the already low incomes of the local population. The cities of Zhezkazgan and Satpayev in Central Kazakhstan have been depressed regions for many years, with job losses and rising unemployment amid falling production of minerals. [6, p 13].

The American scholar Noah Tucker also points to unresolved social problems as a factor in religious radicalization in Central Asia [16].

Meanwhile, women who returned from Syria again faced difficulties of a material nature, most of them do not have their own housing, they live with relatives or rent housing. It should be noted that the vast majority of returnee women have many children and support from three to six children. The majority of women do not have secondary or higher education. Moreover, after receiving vocational training as part of the rehabilitation and reintegration program, not all of them have found employment. This is attributed by experts to the dependency mentality of women [9].

Nowadays, there is a problem of inability of many women and guardians of children without parents to receive social benefits for loss of breadwinner, despite the availability of information about the death of men in military actions, which is connected with legal conflicts. For example, residents of Zhezkazgan and Satpayev cannot get their relatives declared dead or missing by the court [17].

The courts, in response, refer to Article 11 of the normative resolution of the Supreme Court of the RK “On judicial practice in cases of declaring a citizen missing or declared dead,” which does not allow a person who deliberately hides or is wanted in connection with the commission of a criminal offence to be declared missing or dead. In this case, the presence of persons wanted for terrorist crimes is an obstacle to financial support for their families [18].

Among other international institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly underlined the necessity to treat women and children returning from (terrorist) conflict zones in a different way to their husbands and fathers, protecting specially them as vulnerable victims [19].

Public perception of the returnee rehabilitation program

Gulnaz Razdykova, head of the Zoom-Zhusan rehabilitation center, points to social stigmas as a factor creating an antitherapeutic effect in the rehabilitation of women returned from armed conflict areas [20].

Content analysis of comments to the publications about the return of Kazakh citizens from Syria and Iraq showed that they are dominated by negative mood. The analysis was conducted with the help of OMSystem (<http://oms-demo.kaznu.kz/>) from 08.05.2019 to 14.05.2019. The topic “Operation Zhusan” was selected for the search, with the following words and phrases as keywords: “Zhusan”, “Kazakh women in Syria”, “return of women and children”, “sought caliphate”, “went to *jihad*”, “wahab”, “terrorist accomplices”, “deprive citizenship”. 24 materials and 1280 comments to them published in social networks “VK”, “Instagram”, on video hosting “Youtube”, news websites “Nur.kz”, “zakon.kz”, “Khabar 24”, “Informburo 31”, “KTK Zhanylyktary” were analysed. It should be noted that the publications

were neutral in nature, containing information about the return of Kazakh citizens, mostly women and children, from the armed conflict in the Middle East. At the same time, the predominant content of the comments was negative: 885 comments contained information aimed at condemning the repatriate women, accusing them of terrorist crimes, and expressing dissatisfaction with the allocation of budget funds for their rehabilitation to the detriment of socially vulnerable segments of the population. The most frequent labels were “terrorist women,” “terrorist accomplices,” and “traitors”. 364 neutral comments contained information about the innocence of children and the possibility of their integration into society, the need to inform the public about the process of rehabilitation of women and children. The least positive comments were found, with only 31 messages aimed at supporting the authorities’ discourse on the status of victims of evacuees deceived into the war in Syria and Iraq.



Well it is understandable for children.... it's not too late for them to get their brains right...but the adults, why do they need to be rescued? ?? They are wives and loved ones of terrorists... They have a strict law if your husband was killed by a Kafir, his wife should become a shahid... If I am not mistaken ((Or she may become the wife of another terrorist, second or third wife... In short, it is a double-edged sword....

Poor kids are suffering because of their terrorist parents.

It is possible to give help to all of them for the first time, these people are unhappy and no one becomes radical for no reason; it is necessary to treat them, not to cut them up.

Many of them may have had a difficult past and went to the Middle East, where many from Kazakhstan go.

To run away from Kazakhstan, a peaceful country, to where there is a war. Are you out of your mind? These are potential terrorists. And now we can expect anything from them. I hope the special services will keep them under control and not let anything bad happen.

They're just wasting budget money on them.

You'd better write about the first evacuees, have they realized their mistake and how children are adapting?

They made a mistake thinking they would build a terrorist state, but they failed, so they pretended to be victims but did not give up their ideas... I do

not understand when the government helps terrorists and does not help its disabled poor and disadvantaged citizens.

People shouldn't be so categorical! They have already understood their mistake and a great contribution to the anti-propaganda of radical religious currents of religions

What are they bringing them here for? They left for a better life, let them live there and be happy. It's bad here! They think it's better there. Don't come back! They should be kicked out with a fucking broom, not invited back. They are traitors.

Why bring the terrorists back?.....

Apparently not everyone in our country knows that children there were also trained and processed and called the Caliphate Lionesses. Why do we need them here? If their relatives need them, let them go to Syria and Iraq for them.

It is clear that they are not all right in the head, but only they know why they went there and we do not know what lured them there and why they were brought back, and it is not clear whether they themselves needed it. So one can speculate as much as one wants, but it is a fact that these are dangerous people.

These people were brainwashed by Solofism, they were enlisted and we dragged them back to their home country, it is nonsense! In some countries, such people are banned from entering, so they are on the stop list so as not to sow the seed at home.

I'm against them being brought here. Why do they leave here?! Then they come back here and become terrorists. And our military risk their lives to get them out. It's just a pity about the kids.... But I don't understand the mothers...

Sure, it's all good from the standpoint of humanism, but many of them are lost people who will be difficult to adapt to normal society.

Children are not to blame for anything and it doesn't matter whose they are. And fanatic parents should be placed on permanent records so they do not sneak up on our propaganda. Naturally, not all of them are terrorists, but they are not worth the risk.

How many millions of people's money will go to support terrorists, their rehabilitation, and various benefits for them? I do not want to live in the same city with them, I do not want them to go to school where my children go! I do not want my taxes to go to support terrorism!

Why were these terrorists brought here?! Are you crazy?! They spent so much money, now they will be financed by the taxpayers to feed them, clothe them, and teach them at the expense of the people.

It would be better to help mothers of underprivileged children here than to bring all kinds of terrorists back to our country!!!!




Diagram 1. Comment content, %

According to researchers at the Rand Corporation, an American think-tank, the successful process of deradicalization and reintegration can be hindered by public condemnation and rejection, in which case there is a risk of re-radicalization [21].

Consequently, the weakness of Kazakhstan's deradicalization program is the inconsistent work with public opinion, as well as with the families of female returnees. Specialists point to the continuing stigmatization of repatriate women and, in some cases, aggressive attitudes on the part of relatives. The rehabilitation

process receives virtually no media coverage, and the results of the deradicalization program are discussed in closed expert forums.

Conclusion

An analysis of the Kazakhstan program for the deradicalization of individuals returning from areas of armed conflict revealed a number of systemic problems that hinder rehabilitation and integration efforts:

- Lack of specialists, including women theologians, capable of implementing programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of persons returning from conflict zones;
- Unresolved social and financial problems of returnees;
- Social stigmatization, which creates an anti-terrorist effect;
- Lack of objective indicators of the effectiveness of state programs for rehabilitation and reintegration, their reduction to formal activities and indicators.

Existing vulnerabilities can lead to the re-radicalization of returnees. In this connection, a change of approach to work with returnees is required, taking into account gender specifics, factors of radicalization of women, where the social component is predominant.

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